Let's kill him boldly, but not wrathfully; Let's carve him as a dish fit for the gods, Not hew him as a carcass fit for hounds: And let our hearts, as subtle masters do, Stir up their servants to an act of rage, And after seem to chide 'em. This shall make Our purpose necessary and not envious: Which so appearing to the common eyes, We shall be call'd purgers, not murderers. Rather than a moment of appearance and truth, generative of new possibilities and configurations, failure is sidestepped, managed and superseded. Its denial renders it barren.
political causes, negative emotions play a fundamental role in politics. 7 Thus, for instance, anger has been recently rediscovered as 'the essential political emotion'. 8 Drawing on the classical Aristotelian view of anger as useful and morally justifiable affect, a number of scholars have thus urged to reinstate its moral and political value. 9 Closely related to anger, akin to indignation and yet also never far from rage, resentment has also been defined as 'a moral feeling' that derives from the 'sense of being unfairly treated'. 10 In fact, in his Theory of Moral Justice John Rawls considers resentment as both different from and more important than anger, as a political and moral emotion. While anger can arise independently of situations of injustice, resentment always invokes a concept of right and the existence of a moral grievance. While we may feel indignation towards the wrongs we perceive to have been done to others, resentment concerns wrongs that we perceive as our own, because directed to us. 11 However, although recognising the value of resentment, Rawls is also quick to point out that this emotion can acquire 'perverse and destructive forms'; envy can easily masquerade as resentment just as resentment can easily slip into rancour and bitterness -12 and turn into ressentiment.
Resentment has for long been interpreted as central to a particular mode of political action, namely terrorism. Annette Baier once noted that terrorism has the 'power to make resentment felt'. 13 Similarly, Jon Elster more recently claimed that permanent feelings of resentment are 'the most relevant feature of populations' from which terrorists, in particular suicide bombers, are drawn. 14 Finally, Slavoj Zizek has repeatedly linked the violence of terrorism post-9/11 to the subjective and collective experience of resentment. 15 Understood as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through the threat or use of violence for the in pursuit of political change, terrorism appears as a quintessentially affective political phenomenon, trading in emotions at both ends -in its motivations (resentment) and effects (fear). 16 The political and moral value of resentment is yet to be established uncontroversially, partly due to the political practices it inspires, partly due to the Janus-faced nature of this emotion.
Its ambiguity is well encapsulated in the slight literal variation which separates the two terms commonly used to refer to it -resentment and ressentiment. Resentment has thus been given both a virtuous face, when it indicates a legitimate response to a perceived injustice; and vicious features, when it is engorged with metaphysical envy and narcissistic rage.
Interestingly, recent political and IR theory has tended to subsume or fold the former into the latter, discussing resentment predominantly, if not uniquely, as ressentiment. 17 In this paper I argue that there is value in redeeming the distinction between the resentment and ressentiment and in rescuing, as much as possible, the former from the relative hegemony of the latter. To do so, I investigate the way in which failures, specifically failures of justice, recognition and status -and the denial of such failures -provide the conditions of possibility for a globalisation of resentment and for the contemporary wave of terrorist violence. The first part of the paper reflects in general terms on failure in International Relations (IR). In particular, it investigates the claim made by a number of scholars, from Ulrich Beck to Wendy Brown, according to which failure today is increasingly experienced at epistemological question of whether one can explain action out of emotion. For a strong defence of this possibility that invokes a narrative approach against the rationalist tradition of either negating emotions or adding them on as ad-hoc 'variables', see Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. 37-49. The question of how to link emotions to terrorism is further complicated by the fact that primary data about the emotional states of clandestine actors is obviously hard to trace or, sometimes, it is entirely unavailable due to the attacker's own death. Interestingly, however, the internet and social media have potentially made this issue less crippling, by making a 'digital ethnography' of terrorism and its emotions possible. See Thomas Hegghammer, ' the level of the individual. In considering how individuals cope with failure, the paper then turns its attention individual emotions as microfoundations of politics, and specifically contemporary terrorism. By drawing on classical and contemporary political theory, the second part of the paper examines the place of resentment in the affective and moral economy of the global age. The paper here teases out some of the key distinctions between resentment and ressentiment as emotions that respond to two different kinds of failures:
failures of justice, on the one hand, and failures of recognition or status, on the other. The third part of the paper gestures at their contemporary configurations.
To illustrate the epistemic, normative and political relevance of my argument, the fourth part of the paper examines the case of the Paris terror attacks of 7 January and 13 November.
Discerning whether resentment or ressentiment was at the heart of the attacks -the worst in recent European history -is crucial for a number of reasons. Attributing the attacks to resentment or ressentiment yields different 'intelligence' about the situation in which they occurred, enabling different epistemic insights. 18 This has also important implications for our moral evaluations of the events. Finally, depending on whether we recognise the attacks as resentment or ressentiment, different responses will be required, appropriate and justified.
Ultimately, by raising the issue of the moral value of resentment and ressentiment, the paper seeks to address the question of how to cope with failure in global politics: whether through emancipatory or non-emancipatory projects, whether through self-affirming or selfsabotaging political practices.
Coping with Failure: Globalization, Immanence and Violent Individuation
If progress and emancipation arguably formed the double totem of Western modernity, failure constituted the 'limit-situation' which, to paraphrase Karl Jaspers, set modernity 'whirling' and announced the coming of its crisis. 19 Thinkers of late modernity such as Ulrich Beck, Zygmunt Bauman and Bruno Latour have, in recent times, concerned themselves with theorising politics and society as increasingly complex systems that can and often do fail. 20 The progressive inclusion, immanentization and ontologization of failure has thus drawn particular attention to the role of accidents, risks, contingencies and complexity in governing global societies -a trend which IR has quickly latched onto and which sits at the heart of its 18 Here I apply Martha Nussbaum's insights about the 'intelligence of emotions ' speculative, precautionary and new materialist turn. 21 More recently, resilience has emerged as the paradigm most closely invested in considering failure as a 'fact of life' which must be welcomed, managed and successfully overcome.
As critical IR scholarship has amply demonstrated, however, risk and resilience seem to function today as the preeminent rationalities of neo-liberal governance. 'Neoliberal citizenship', Mark Neocleus claims, 'is nothing if not a training in resilience'. 22 The rationality of resilience and the move towards an ontologization of risk, thus, descend from the injunction to cope with 'what is' and its failures -whatever these may be -without asking necessarily why these may be so. Questions concerning causes, consequences and responsibility are cast away as modernist and dualist relics, swallowed up by an everencompassing flat and monist ontology that demands 'its due'. 23 Failures are less and less subjected to causal and moral analysis, while they are more and more considered as horizontal 'entanglements' to be sidestepped and managed, rather than solved in any meaningful way. 24 The injunction to incessantly cope with and adapt to failure crucially applies not only to systems, societies and polities. As Michel Foucault presciently argued, this injunction trickles all the way down and ends up applying first and foremost to individuals. 25 Beck claimed specifically that the tragic individualisation of late modernity flows directly from failure: 'the individual must cope with the uncertainty of the global world by him-or herself. Here individualization is a default outcome of a failure of expert systems to manage risks. […] Sustaining an individual self of integrity in world risk society is indeed a tragic affair '. 26 Similarly, Bauman vividly portrayed the individual condition as one of extreme vulnerability to systemic failures and yet full responsibility for their costs. 'The responsibility for resolving the quandaries generated by vexingly volatile and constantly changing circumstances is shifted 21 shootings -self-radicalisation is no longer exceptional, but increasingly frequent and possible. 32 The terrorist movements of today, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, rely on a diasporic and horizontal pool of volunteers who are often encouraged to act independently, sometimes under only the most tenuous direction. 33 As noted by a number of scholars, if there is a thread common to the latest wave of terrorist attacks, it is arguably the way in which personal resentments resonate with and are embedded in larger political narratives and grievances which are today global in scope. 34 Personal resentments can actualise, resonate and reverberate with collective ones. Thus, resentment towards the failure of multiculturalism, integration and assimilation has regularly been combined with personal resentments in the justification of the terror of recent attacks. 35 Resentment linked to the perceived humiliation of Arabs and Muslims at the hands of Westerners, especially the US, since 9/11, provides another important dimension. 36 As Jessica Stern has recently noted concerning ISIS, the 'narrative of victory most appeals to 32 The role of social media in this process can hardly be those who feel they have lost something'. 37 In identifying themselves as 'the brothers who have refused to live a life of humiliation', 38 ISIS frames the movement's grievances in terms of an aspirational parable that turns failure into success, loss into the recovery of dignity.
Finally, the contemporary wave of terrorist attacks mobilises the much deeper and transhistorical reservoir of resentment felt towards colonialization and imperial histories. This becomes clear if one considers that ISIS presented the breaking of the borders created by the 1916 Sykes-Picot treaty between Syria and Iraq as one of their greatest victory and indeed the symbolic moment of establishment of the caliphate. 39 Additionally, the fact that at least three of the Paris attackers were of Algerian descent has been noted as being arguably significant. 40 While the main theoretical preoccupation of today seems to be how to sidestep, handle and overcome the effects failure through resilience and risk management, the move to make failure immanent and ontological only succeeds in pushing failure (and its real effects) down to the level of the individual. The micropolitics of affect that presides over the ways in which failure is processed, blame and responsibility are attributed, shame and humiliations are handled, and resentments are articulated thus becomes crucial. This is especially important 41 Two important caveats are in order before proceeding further. A study into the origins and dimensions of resentment should be confused neither with a deterministic account of terrorism, nor with a justification of actions inspired by it. In terms of the former, scholarship has long accepted that terrorism is best understood in processual terms and as a contingency-ridden multi-causal . Not all resentful individuals become terrorists, after all. However, while this means that terrorism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be explained by a single cause or set of causes, this does not mean that resentment in causally unimportant. In terms of the latter, as a particularly heinous form of political violence, terrorism generates deep moral dilemmas -its legitimacy has been almost invariably been denied, at least until recently (see infra, fn. 88). In so far as it violently calls into question pre-given political
Resentment or Ressentiment? On the Moral and Political Status of a Global Emotion.
Resentment has a long history and a bad name. It is one of those negative emotions which, according to historians and philologists, have driven the movement of human development.
The history of resentment can be considered as parallel to that of progress, if not a countermelody born from its very failures. 42 In this history resentment has an ambiguous placesimilarly to violence, it is deemed to be both a creative and a destructive force, a functional or dysfunctional attitude. 43 In its positive incarnation, resentment is the guardian of justice. 44 As a moral emotion, resentment is not only an appropriate individual response to failures of justice, but it is also an indispensable attitude to cultivate if an overall degree of fairness is to be maintained in in the context of other moral virtues, such as charity and compassion, Butler concluded that resentment is needed precisely to allow injustices to be acknowledged and injuries to be punished, rather than merely forgiven or forgotten. In some circumstances, therefore, resentment is morally superior to charity. Although acknowledging its potentially beastly character, unsocial nature and violent potential, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith painted a similarly positive picture of resentment. According to Smith, resentment functions as a necessary corrective to imbalances in justice and as that reparative mechanism which restores society to a state of harmony and fairness. 46 Once restrained and tempered of any of its excesses, resentment becomes that 'noble and generous' feeling of indignation that inspires the sympathetic recognition of others and transforms a community of strangers into a community of moral agents bound by the same nomos. 47 The contemporary political philosophy of scholars such as Jeffrie Murphy, Margaret Walker and Robert Solomon follows on from these arguments, combining the insights from Adam Smith with a revived Aristotelian view of resentment and anger as morally justifiable and useful affects. 48 Robert Solomon goes as far as to assert that, as 'a passion of justice denied […] , resentment lies at the heart of democracy'. 49 It is the emotional state which, more than any other sentiment, proves that we care about and are 'committed to certain moral standards, as regulative of social life'. 50 What is judged detrimental if not wholly questionable, in these authors' view, is thus not the place of resentment within the moral order. Rather, it is the contemporary prejudice against negative emotions and the overriding fixation for 'closure' that places societies at fault when it prevents them from acknowledging and remedying injustices. Therefore, it is the absence of resentment in the face of injustice that should be denounced as immoral. There is virtue in resentment, in other words. As Jean Améry stated, there is virtue in the moral 'vertigo' of resentment that disrupts the moral order and prevents hasty attempts at reconciliation. 51 It is only because of resentment that 46 Strikingly, it is in Theory of Moral Sentiments that Smith uses for the first time the now well-known metaphor of the 'invisible hand', namely that self-regulating mechanism responsible for restoring harmony in markets or, as it happens, moral orders. In Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 215. 47 ' We admire that noble and generous resentment which governs its pursuit of the greatest injuries, not by the rage which they are apt to excite in the breast of the sufferer, but by the indignation which they naturally call forth in that of the impartial spectator', in ibid., 30. 48 For a brief overview, see Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue, 10-11. 49 injustices become 'a moral reality' and it is only through resentment that an entire community, including perpetrators of injustice, are 'swept into the truth'. 52 Amongst contemporary political philosophers, however, a much less positive understanding of resentment ordinarily circulates. This is due to the hegemony exercised by the Nietzschean reading of a quintessentially existentialist notion, that of ressentiment. 53 While resentment is understood to denote a legitimate sense of anger, and a desire for justice in the face of an injury, ressentiment indicates the pernicious and self-defeating folding in of this emotion onto itself. Ressentiment is suspended, delayed or botched revenge. As a frustrated, ossified and ultimately generalised form of resentment, ressentiment plants itself in the psychic underground of the sufferer as a blunt arrow, kept in permanent tension by the pain or memory of humiliation, yet never released from the bow of desire. 54 am not you"'. 57 Ressentiment is the affect that underpins the construction of scapegoats, the exercise of revenge, and the affirmation of a negative or inverted form of enjoyment. For the subject experiencing ressentiment, enjoyment comes more from the misfortunes of others than an increase in one's well-being. Imposing one's suffering on others through revenge therefore becomes a way of actualising one's negative enjoyment. 58 In classical and modern political theory, thus, resentment and ressentiment occupy very different places on the emotional spectrum. At an analytical level, the two emotions differ along a series of important dimensions -including the level of motives, diagnosis, attribution of blame, temporal frame, recommendations, and consequences. Thus, while resentment is preoccupied with injustice and is moved by moral grievances deriving from perceived failures of justice, ressentiment is concerned with inequality and fuelled by the envy deriving form 58 The readings of ressentiment given by Nietzsche and Scheler overlap yet also differ considerablyinter alia, in terms of the degree of emphasis laid on envy as the underlying motive of ressentiment and in terms of the possibility of channeling and venting ressentiment into revenge. As brilliantly argued in Brodersen, 'Rage, Rancour and Revenge',156-58, Nietzsche understands revenge to be exclusively in spiritual rather than actual terms, while in Scheler the possibility of actual revenge stems directly from the misplaced aggression of ressentiment. Contra Brodersen, however, I argue that one should not infer from this that Schelerian ressentiment equates to 'simple' resentment incorrectly named and, as such, is not real ressentiment. The tension of ressentiment is precisely the one that survives after its necessarily partial revenge is consummated. ESP as means to revenge become easier. 59 
Resentment and Ressentiment in Late Modernity
Rather than being exclusively private or merely physiological, emotions are social and cultural too -the psychic and affective landscape changing with the changing social and political condition. 60 A number of theorists have reflected on the issue of whether the political and social conditions of late modernity at a time of rampant neoliberalism and incessant securitization promote emotions of resentment or ressentiment.
William Connolly's writings on the politics of resentment are a particularly interesting case in point. Connelly's concern with resentment stems from a long-standing interest in how to ground democratic societies in the 'globalisation of contingency' of late modernity on an egalitarian and pluralist ethos. 61 While Connolly acknowledges that resentment and moral indignation arguably are 'indispensable sources of energy and inspiration' for the formation of new political subjects and social movements, 62 he warns about the exclusions and excesses spawned in the process. Identity politics, in particular, is always potentially also a politics of resentment that deprecates, rages against, and ultimately punishes difference. 63 If the origins of resentment lie in the entanglements and paradoxes of identity and difference, for Connolly ressentiment is altogether 'another matter'. 64 Connolly, in particular, recognises two routes into ressentiment. The first relies on a Nietzschean reading of ressentiment and places the origins of this emotion outside of the immediate political fray, within a secondorder, metaphysical plane. Ressentiment is a form of existential resentment against 'mortality, time, and the world' -against our finitude. 65 The second route into ressentiment, however, is moral and political -and highlights the transition, rather than the opposition, between resentment and ressentiment. 'Ressentiment is stored resentment that has poisoned the soul and migrated to places where it is hidden and denied', 66 'it can grow out of an accumulation of justified resentments' and can get dangerously congealed and 'encoded into the spirit of institutional life', endangering pluralism. 67 Thus, not all forms of ressentiment are without political or moral bases. The failure to acknowledge and respond to protracted grievances causes resentment to fester and escalate into ressentiment. The denial of failure, in other words, leaves the subject worse off than the experience of failure itself. This is not least true, as Gilles Deleuze has argued, because it consigns the subject to an emotion that is alienating and non-emancipatory. Far from being an active and positive mode of political action, ressentiment decomposes resistance and incapacitates contestation. 68 Crucially, for
Connolly the contemporary condition is one around which these two routes into ressentiment converge and 'whirl together'. 69 In her writings, Wendy Brown has similarly mobilised the concept of ressentiment to account for the particular character and formation of identities in late modernity. 70 According to Brown, the contemporary subject is characterised by a condition of radical failure and diffuse envy. On the one hand, the failure to measure up to the idealised standard of the 'middle class'. On the other, the envy experienced towards the model of the sovereign, liberal individual. The consequence is that the subject 'seethes with ressentiment', 71 an emotion which appears to be a general and fundamental existential condition in the 'plastic cage' of late modern societies. 72 Contemporary ressentiment, according to Brown, exhibits three main characteristics. First, the externalization and displacement of suffering, which involves the production of scapegoats: 'a culprit responsible for the hurt, and […] a site of revenge to displace the hurt' and the re-enactment, rather than the resolution, of injuries as they are distributed and externalised to others. 73 Second, a failure of the will: 'identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence', generating only a blunted critique of power and returning incessantly to its own narcissistic wounds, rather than finding ground for genuine self-affirmation. 74 Third, the proliferation and sacralisation of the condition of victim.
In noting the rise of victimary narratives and of a moralizing politics of recognition, Brown anticipates the coming of that 'empire of trauma' which anthropologists Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman identify as being a constitutive cipher of the contemporary moral economy. 75 This is a perspective also shared by the French-American theorist Réne Girard. 76 Rivalry and envy, already normally present in human relations given their inevitably mimetic nature, 77 seem to have escalated out of proportions in late modernity. 78 The triumph of the very operating principles of liberal and capitalist societies, namely equality and the market, and their competitive effects are now amplified on a global scale. 79 Furthermore, immanence and the loss of any transcendental points of reference consign humanity to give up its normative horizons and live and fight its battles mimetically, which means violently. Both principles operate on and multiply the occasions for comparisons and envy. This is further escalated by the fact that the promise of equality and wealth is frustrated by the reality of inequality and structural imbalances that are often simply denied by society. All resentments, therefore, are turned into ressentiment: questions of justice are ontologised, rendered horizontal and turned into mere questions of comparison, recognition and status. In resonance with Connolly and Brown, 80 Girard states that we live in a world where many people, rightly or wrongly, feel blocked, or paralyzed, in all aspirations, obstructed from achieving their most legitimate goals. Individual psychology inevitably ends up resenting this permanent frustration, and the need arises for a term that expresses this state of affair.
[…] The word ressentiment seems designed to play this role. 81 As seen from this brief survey, in contemporary political theory the difference between resentment and ressentiment remains crucial in terms of its moral and political implications. misdirected and generalised resentment better understood as ressentiment? Was radical envy as a result of perceived inferiority, rather than a sense of justice, at the heart of these attacks -an envy only magnified by exclusionary victimary narratives? Were the attacks a reflection of perceived impotence, rather than power, and the expression of a narcissistic fantasy aimed at violently inverting a negative power differential, rather than rectify specific wrongs? Finally, did the attacks manifest a mixture of the qualities above and how, if at all, can we make sense of any overlaps?
Although left implicit, the conceptual pair of resentment and ressentiment, with their related questions, was arguably key in driving the debate that followed the attacks.
Thus, while they didn't justify the attacks, a number of intellectuals attributed moral and political significance to them. For instance, the French sociologist Emanuel Todd read the events firstly, as proof of resentment deriving from a reality of deep injustice and discrimination; and, secondly, as providing important insights about the French the social and political situation, dominated by an Islamophobic middle-class and a myopic defence of the principle of freedom of speech. The recognition, rather than denial, of grievances formed part of the only possible political solution. 85 On the other hand, the position which prevailed in both French and British governments attributed no political or moral significance to the attacks. Attempts to understand the causes of the attacks amounted to mere 'sociological excuses' and thus a worthless endeavour. 86 Rather, the attacks were interpreted as a mindless vendetta, with no relation to issues of justice but part of a delusional plan fuelled by rancour and envy -bearing the hallmark, in other words, of ressentiment. No insights were to be gained from the attacks, if not the increased need for robust counter-terrorist policies against 'enemies' -a 'fascist' 'death cult' 87 -rather than political actors.
The use of political violence by non-state actors has always historically generated great moral ambivalence and political polarisation. Of all types of political violence, terrorism was until recently the one traditionally considered not only the most contentious, but invariably the most illegitimate. 88 It is unsurprising therefore that the double attacks in Paris generated such stark responses. However, if we now return to the questions raised above, to what extent can we see traces of resentment or ressentiment in the attacks?
It would be hard not to recognise that the violence seen in Paris demonstrated once again the power of resentment and that terrorism should be understood as a particularly dramatic 'power to make resentment felt'. 89 Genuine resentment towards a specific set of issues was after all expressed in the statements and testimonials left by the attackers, all too often casually dismissed in the media as 'bizarre rants'. 90 These manifested the degree of anger ad extreme unease towards three specific sets of issues: the limits of multicultural integration and the conditions of Muslims in France; the failures, excesses and crimes of post-9/11
Western interventions in the Middle East; the uncomfortable legacy of colonial history. As painful reminder of how these issues remain unresolved, resentment and the violence that this generates can hold up a mirror to societies often too tempted to achieve 'closure' prematurely and unfairly, if not deny failure altogether. As recognised by Adam Smith and Joseph Butler, more than reconciliation or forgiveness it is the expression, rather than denial, of this resentment and its sympathetic recognition by others that potentially turns a community of strangers into a community of moral agents bound by the same nomos.
As Connolly warns, however, the more this process of recognition is delayed or stalled, the higher the likelihood that such resentment may fold in onto itself, ossify and re-present itself as ressentiment. When ressentiment takes over, justice leaves the scene and revenge takes over -the aim of depriving and making others suffer becomes more important than affirming one's worth. Depriving innocent civilians of life and the enjoyment theoreof, as happened in Paris, constitutes a powerful clue of a resentment turned ressentiment. And yet, a few questions should make us hesitate before reaching any definitive conclusions. After all, the persistence of grievances can hardly make the same grievances illegitimate. Further, it is sufficient to look at the history of terrorism to know that the killing of innocent lives has been, at times, the only way to have grievances finally addressed. 91 […] The problem is not cultural difference (their effort to preserve their identity), but the opposite fact that the fundamentalists are already like us, that, secretly, they have already internalized our standards and measure themselves by them. Paradoxically, what the fundamentalists really lack is precisely a dose of that true 'racist' conviction of their own superiority. 92 Rather than demonstrating a 'clash of civilisations' and a desire to assert irreconcilable differences, in Zizek's account the encounter between Islamic terrorists and the West seems to function according to a hyper-mimetic and imitative logic, which is the logic of envy and ressentiment. Envy is here to be understood less in patronizing terms and more as the inevitable loss of self-dignity which Frantz Fanon vividly described in the colonized -who lived across from the spectacle of colonial modernity, 'felt robbed of all of these things' and yet could only measure themselves by the master's own standards. 93 It is the relentless comparison and frustrated desire of identity, rather than difference -including religious difference -that fuels ressentiment and its violent expressions. This, however, can hardly be understood as a condition exclusive to terrorists. The flattening of relations and the refusal of any verticality makes failure immanent and ontological; this risks turning issues of justice into a mere envy-generating competition over status. As the paper has illustrated, a number of scholars converge in identifying this as the increasingly global condition under the spell of a failed or 'fake egalitarianism', and on the verge of an 'uncontrollable explosion of ressentiment '. 94 If the Paris double attacks of 2015 teach us anything, therefore, it is that today it is imperative to resist conflating resentment and ressentiment and, instead, rescue as much as possible the former from the latter. Just as we need to avoid narrowing failure down conceptually to the mere management of its effects, we must resist any excessive infatuations with immanence that precludes the possibility of normative standards. By the very same token, it is imperative to reclaim those moral and political emotions that are able to render failure once again political, rather than just contingent, steering us away from the moral and political morass of late modernity. 95 Privileging resentment over ressentiment, however, makes demands on ourselves. First, it asks us to go against powerful environmental stimuli that are currently converging to create ressentiment as our sovereign mode of being. Secondly, it expects us to be incessantly aware of our own nature and limitations as deeply imitative subjects, prone to envy and narcissism. Thirdly, it demands that we build societies able to cultivate resentment, rather than ressentiment, and able to denounce failure rather than embrace resilience, so that we can feel -and feel more deeply -a sense of moral outrage on behalf of others and their grievances. 95 On what moral philosophy and political theory should this more positive notion of resentment be founded on and channelled into is an important question that unfortunately exceeds the scope of this paper. Pace Hunt, 'Affirmative Responses', whether Nietzsche's philosophy of ressentiment can still provide such a frame of reference seems, however, debatable.
